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CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW-A BASIS
OF WORLD GOVERNMENT
NORMAN BIERMAN
The past decade since the conclusion of the World War has
witnessed a distinct change in the attitude of nations and peo-
ples towards that branch of jurisprudence known as "Inter-
national Law." The experience of the recent war taught the
world that no nation can hereafter preserve its seclusion and
live apart. The remarkable progress of invention in the fields of
transportation and communication, the tremendous increase in
tourist travel in Europe and Asia, the more intelligent discus-
sion of international problems by the press, have all tended to
relax the barriers of nationalism and to create a new and lively
interest on the part of the nations and peoples of the world in
the development of international relations and international law.
The establishment of the League of Nations and the Permanent
Court of International Justice mark the farthest steps in the ad-
vancement and development of machinery for the government
of the world community and the amicable settlement of any dis-
putes which may arise by the application of rules of law, rather
than by the ancient institution of war with its resulting chaos
and destruction.
The term "International Law"', is used to denote the principles
and rules that express the conception that gradually has grown
up of the proper behaviour of civilized nations to each other or
to the members of each other. It consists of a slowly developed
body of rules which all modern nations recognize as binding
upon them in their intercourse with the rest of the civilized
world. 2 To the formation of these rules, statesmen, diplomats,
admirals, generals, judges, and publicists have all contributed.
It is of comparatively modern origin, dating in effect from the
end of the middle ages.3
1 The expression "International Law" was created by Jeremy Bentham in
1780.
'REED, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1925) 1.
"So long as the States of Europe acknowledged the supremacy of a
great world power, whether the spiritual dominion of the papacy or the
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There are two primary sources of positive international law,
(1) custom, based on tacit consent and imitation; and (2) con-
vention, or express agreement by means of treaties. Customary
international law is the "Common Law of Nations which has
developed gradually from usage or precedents set by particular
States as the result of acquiescence or imitation on the part of
the other members of the international community. It has as
its guarantee or sanction the consensus and usage of the civilized
world, and it forms the oldest and intrinsically the most im-
portant portion of International Law for it is deeply rooted in
the habits, sentiments, and interests of mankind."
'4
By the side of the customary law there has grown up a large
body of conventional law. This consists of definite written
rules, many of which are merely declaratory of pre-existing cus-
toms and practices, but many of which also consist of new rules
or of innovations upon former usages. The steady transforma-
tion of international law from a mass of custom, practice, and
judicial precedent into a body of written law, formulated in the
main by international congresses or conferences and embodied
in the texts of multi-lateral conventions, acts, or declarations
which have been ratified or consented to by the whole body of
states, has been the most significant development of inter-
national law during the past century. This transformation has
been distinctly beneficial since much of what was formerly un-
certain and indefinite has been given the character of precision
and definiteness; divergence of interpretation and practice have
been harmonized; the occasions for controversy have been cor-
respondingly reduced and international law has tended more
and more to acquire the characteristics of municipal law. The
progress which has thus been made in the clarification of inter-
temporal overlordship of the Emperor there was no possibility of the ex-
istence of a system of International Law, but with the Reformation and the
termination of the wars of religion in the middle of the 17th century, and
the coming into being of a large number of independent sovereign states
freed from the trammels of religious and political obedience to external
authority, Pope or Emperor, the principles which Grotius and other writers
had advocated became capable of realization. The way was opened for the
Supremacy of a new power, the Reign of Law." Higgins, THE BINDING
FORCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1.
'Hershey, ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW (1912) 20.
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national law has encouraged men to believe that the rules of
law now found in a multiplicity of international conventions,
acts and declarations, together with those which are still un-
written but which have received the sanction of practice and of
judicial authority, can be collected and reduced to a single har-
monious system or body, as the municipal law of many states
has been. This movement towards the codification of inter-
national law was first propounded by Jeremy Bentham,5 and
was followed by private attempts at codification by Abbe
Gregoire,6 Alfons von Domin Petruschevecz,7 Francis Lieber,
Bluntschli, 9 Mancini,o and David Dudley Field.1'
Following these early private attempts at codification we have
the formation of two great associations for the study and ad-
vancement of the science of international law. In 1873 the
Institute of International Law was founded at Ghent in Bel-
gium, and in the same year the Association for the Reform and
Codification of the Law of Nations, now called the International
Law Association, was also founded.1 2  During the period be-
'B3ENTHAM'S WORKS, (Bowring ed.) viii, p. 537; Nys. 11 L. QUAR. Rnv.
(1885) 226-231. He did not, however, propose codification of the existing
positive law of nations, but thought of a utopian international law which
could be the basis of an everlasting peace between the civilized states.
'Abbe Gregoire was charged by the French Convention in 1792 to create
a Declaration of the Rights of Nations. In 1795 he proposed a draft of
twenty-one articles which was rejected by the Convention and the matter
dropped. See 1 Rivier 40, where full text is given.
'This Austrian jurist in 1861 made the first real attempt to show the
possibility of codification by publishing in that year, at Leipzig, a "Precis
d'un Code de Droit International."
I At the request of President Abraham Lincoln, Professor Francis Lieber,
of Columbia College, New York, drafted the laws of war in a body of rules
which the United States published in 1863 for the guidance of her army.
See 2 Oppenheim, par. 68.
'In 1868, Bluntschli, the celebrated Swiss interpreter of the law of na-
tions, published "Das moderne Volkerrecht der civilisirten Staaten als
Rechtsbuch dargestellt." This draft code was translated into French,
Greek, Spanish, and Russian, and the Chinese Government produced an
official Chinese translation as a guide for Chinese officials.
" The great Italian politician and jurist Mancini raised his voice in favor
of codification of the law of nations in his able essay "Vocazione del nostro
secolo per la reforma e codificazione del diritto delle genti" (1872).
"Draft Outlines of an International Code" published at New York in
1872.
" Oppenheim, L. INTERNATIONAL LAw (1912) 37.
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tween the years 1880 and 1911 we find four more attempts at
codification by private individuals, namely those by Leone Levi,1-
Fiore,14 Duplessix,'15 and Jerome Internoscia. 1
In 1899 the first Hague Peace Conference was called together
by the initiative of the Emperor Nicholas II of Russia. This
conference showed the possibility of partial codification of inter-
national law by producing two important conventions which
might be classed as codes-namely first, "the Convention for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes," upon which the
Hague Court of Arbitration was founded, and secondly, the
"Convention with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land." Forty-three nations became members of the Hague
Court of Arbitration since 1899, when the court was established.
Fifteen cases have been referred to this Court.17  The second
convention mentioned above gave the nations a model, which by
its very existence teaches that codification of parts of the law
of nations is practicable.
The second Hague Peace Conference met in 1907 and produced
thirteen conventions and one declaration. 8 At this second
Hague Conference the American delegates were instructed by
Secretary of State Root to endeavor to develop the Hague Court
into a permanent court, holding regular and continuous sessions,
composed of judges who would be official officers and nothing
else, and who would devote their entire time to the trial and de-
cision of international disputes by judicial methods and under a
sense of judicial responsibility.19 The World War broke out
while the nations in the Second Hague Conference were still dis-
cussing methods of electing the judges.
Leone Levi, in 1887 published his INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH MA-
TERIALS FOR A CODE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
' In 1890 the Italian jurist Fiore published IL DRITrO INTERNAZIONALE
CODIFICATO E SuE SANzIONE GrURWICA. A fourth edition appeared in
1911.
'In 1906 E. Duplessix published his "La loi des Nations. Projet d'insti-
tution dune autorite nationale, legislative, administarative, judiciare. Pro-
jet de Code de Croit international public."
In 1911 Jerome Internoscia published his NEw CODE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW in English, French, and Italian.
See Reed, op. cit. 111.
Oppenheim, op. cit. 207, 213.
No agreement, however, could be reached on the method of electingjudges, as the great Powers were not yet willing to entrust their interests
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The close of the World War found a popular demand for a
lucid statement of existing international law. In many coun-
tries a host of advocates were creating a popular belief that the
right way to get rid of war, and to substitute justice for force,
was to draw up a great new "Benthamist code" of international
law. They pointed to the great weakness of international law,
that to ascertain what the law actually is one must go to text-
books and to a great variety of statements, differing, incon-
sistent, many of them obscure and vague and capable of differ-
ent interpretations, so that the instant the occasion for the ap-
plication of the law arises, there is pressed upon the conflicting
or disputing nations, the question as to what the law is, without
any clear and definite standard from which to ascertain it.2o
A systematic arrangement of the law now found in a multi-
plicity of international conventions, acts, and declarations, and
the collection and reduction to a single harmonious body of those
acts and conventions which have received the sanction of prac-
tice and of judicial authority but which are still unwritten
would be, therefore, a momentous step toward the establishment
of a firm legal foundation upon which the agencies of a world
government based upon law, could be safely built.
There are however numerous arguments advanced against the
movement for codification of international law. The opponents
of codification base their objections mainly upon the difficulties
which stand in the way but there are still some jurists who are
not convinced that it would be desirable even if it were practi-
cable.21 It is unquestionable that the task of reducing to the
form of a written code the rules of international law is a much
more difficult undertaking than the codification by a single state
of its own municipal law. The task of national codification in-
to a court on which they might not be represented, and the small nations
felt that as sovereign and therefore legally equal powers, they must have
an equal voice in the election of judges; if they could not come to the court
as judges, they would not come to it to be judged.
InRoot, Elihu: Should International Law be Codified? ADDRESSES ON
INTERNATIONAL SUBJEcTS (1916) 406.
1 Mr. P. J. Baker in his article on Codification of International Law ap-
pearing in the BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1924, collects
and presents the arguments of those jurists who oppose codification on the
ground that it is not desirable even if it should be practicable.
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volves little more than a systematic and authoritative statement
of the law already enacted or accepted by the legislative and
judicial authorities of the state. The codification of inter-
national law, on the other hand, involves, in the first place, agree-
ment among the whole body of sovereign states as to what the
law is which it is proposed to codify. There is no common
superior authority for determining the content of the law and
endowed with power to impose it on the body of the States.
There is no relation of legal superiority or inferiority; states
are on a footing of legal equality, and the law which governs
their relations must be determined by them through common
action or accepted by them voluntarily. Furthermore the mass
of materials with which the international codifier must deal are
wholly different in character from those with which the codi-
fiers of municipal law have to deal. "Instead of a tangible body
of statutory law and a fairly definite body of judicial precedent
the codifier of international law is confronted with a vast mass
of opinion and practice, often conflicting, found in the books of
text writers, in treaties, in the diplomatic correspondence of
different governments and in the decisions of national courts. ' ' 22
For these reasons it was argued that the time is not yet "ripe"
for the codification of international law; it is not sufficiently de-
veloped to be reduced to precise and definite rules; "It was nec-
essary, therefore," some jurists said, "to wait until an interna-
tional court and perhaps a legislative organ have been estab-
lished, the one to formulate the law and the other to interpret
and develop it. ' ' 23 At this time it was argued that what was
most needed was the establishment of an international court to
which could be left the task of codification, as it has been left
to the courts of England and the United States to develop their
municipal law. The establishment of the Permanent Court of
International Justice thus accentuated rather than diminished
the desire and necessity for codification. One of the main rea-
sons advanced by those who strongly opposed the entrance of
the United States into the World Court was that the law which
the court would be called upon to apply was not certain and not
Garner, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1925) 762.
Ibid. 764.
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codified.2' Mr. Balfour, as a member of the Council of the
League of Nations, opposed the proposal to give the Permanent
Court of International Justice compulsory jurisdiction mainly
because international law was not codified.25 This raises the in-
teresting question as to what law the Court will apply when
cases come up before it for consideration. The Statute (Article
38) of the Court provides that it shall apply:
1. International conventions, whether general or particu-
lar, establishing rules expressly recognized by the con-
testing states;
2. The general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations.
3. International Custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
4 .... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as sub-
sidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
26
From a consideration of the above "laws" which the court is
to apply, it can be seen that a code of international law which
would be so broad and elastic that it would not cut off the organic
growth and future development of the law would greatly enhance
the efficiency of the Court by eliminating the uncertainty of the
maze of customs and conventions which at this time constitute
the body of law applied by the Court in rendering its decisions.
Some people were of the opinion before the establishment of
the Permanent Court of International Justice that the organiza-
tion of the Court would do away with the necessity for the codi-
fication of international law since the Court by its decisions
would slowly develop a body of case law, and in time would thus
build up a structure of international constitutional law which
would be superior to an imperfect code. They argued that since
the judges of the new Court were to write reasoned opinions,
the decisions themselves should furnish in time a body of inter-
national law. However, Mr. David J. Hill, one of America's
"Hudson, PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (1925) 268.
Senator Borah objected to the World Court because its creation was not
preceded by a codification of international law.
" World Peace Foundation pamphlet: The First Assembly of the League
of Nations, p. 111.
"Hudson, op. cit. 15.
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learned jurists, believes that this view overlooks two important
considerations:
(1) That municipal judges derive their authority from
the sovereignty of the State in which they act, while in the
field of international legislation there is no single sover-
eignty from which that authority is derived; so that it is
absurd, as Mr. Root has pointed out, to assert that a French
judge may make the law for Italy, or an Italian judge for
France. (2) That the Supreme Court of the United States,
for example, does not make the law, but only declares what,
under the limitations of the Constitution, the law made by
our legislative bodies actually is. Were the Court of Inter-
national Justice restrained by no law, and were it free to
declare to be law its own decisions, however just these might
be, the Court would possess and exercise an unlimited uni-
versal sovereign power, superior to that of any single State,
and even to that of all States combined, if they were under
obligation to obey it. It is therefore, only by framing pro-
jects of law which may be accepted and ratified by the legis-
lative bodies of Sovereign States to which the law is to be
applied, that is by their previous consent, that international
law can grow, and at the same time possess real and undis-
puted authority. 7
Mr. Hill is undoubtedly right. As long as nations adhere to
the ancient ideas of sovereignty the only method of reaching
agreement on any doctrines which are intended to become part
of the Law of Nations is to secure the acquiescence of all the
nations of the world, and this can only be obtained by means of
international conferences and congresses similar to those held
at The Hague in 1899 and 1907.28
21 Hill, THE PROBLEM OF A WORLD COURT (1927) 33.
'An interesting analogy has been drawn by Mr. Hill between the func-
tioning of our own Supreme Court and that of the World Court. "The
government of the United States," he points out, "was created by a written
document in which the powers and duties of government were clearly de-
fined. A union of States deeming themselves wholly independent and
sovereign was founded upon the conception of a fundamental written law
which created the government. A Supreme Court had been established
for the settlement of disputes by the interpretation and applications of the
law. Faith in this system had grown in the United States and had be-
come stronger with the experience which time had afforded. Why, there-
fore, it was natural to ask, if the nations chose to do so, might not they also
agree upon a body of laws, an international corpus juris by which the na-
tions might be willing to be judged sinte it would be by their own law,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss2/3
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That the authors of the League Covenant and the World Court
were looking forward to a codification at least of part (if not
of all) of international law can be seen by an examination of the
documents of these two bodies. The preamble to the Covenant
of the League of Nations envisages "the firm establishment of
the understandings of international law as the actual rule of con-
duct among Governments," and it has increased the desire that
these understandings be more clearly formulated. The com-
mittee of jurists which drafted the Court statute recommended
that a new interstate conference should be called to carry on the
work of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, in formulat-
ing and reestablishing and clarifying international law. The
proposal for this recommendation was made by Elihu Root, a
member of the committee, who felt the incompleteness of any
plan for a tribunal which did not contemplate an agreement up-
on the law of nations, and which should not provide for con-
ferences of the nations in order to agree upon such further
rules of conduct as international conditions should from time to
time suggest or permit. But the suggestion at that time met
considerable opposition. Lord Robert Cecil, representing Great
Britain, declared that "we have not arrived at sufficient calm-
ness of the public mind to undertake that [codification] without
very serious results to the future of international law" and this
view prevailed at the first Assembly of the League of Nations.29
It might be well to mention at this point the arguments of
those jurists who oppose codification on the ground that it
would not be desirable even if practicable. They maintain that
codification, by putting the law into a straight-jacket, would
interfere with its organic growth and natural development and
that a code once agreed upon would soon fail to respond to the
rapidly changing conditions of the times and would therefore
freely accepted by them? And why might not a Court of Justice be estab-
lished by the Nations as well as by the American States, composed of emi-
nent jurists chosen by them, not to make the law, or to be guided by private
reasons or vague principles, but to declare the law previously formulated,
agreed upon, and ratified by the nations themselves, just as the laws of the
United States are made by constitutional conventions and legislatures,
which by their agreement, and not by their dictum, make the laws which
the courts declare and apply in concrete cases. Hill, ibid. 6.
" Records of the First Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 745.
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not be observed by the states which had given it their approval o
It would seem however that the experience of those States
which have codified their municipal law hardly supports this ob-
jection. The tendency towards rigidity which characterizes any
code of laws could be offset by periodic revisions of the inter-
national code and its progressive development through the addi-
tion of new rules to meet changed conditions and situations as
they might arise. In this way the Geneva Convention in 1864
was revised and improved and so were the Hague Conventions
of 1899. The number of jurists who are, at this time, opposed
to the codification on the ground that it is undesirable is very
small. Many more do not favor the attempt because of the
practical difficulties, but they recognize the advantages if only
the difficulties could be overcome. Codification would give the
law a precision, a definiteness, and a certainty which it now
lacks, and if a sufficiently flexible method will be found for alter-
ing it from time to time so as to meet changing conditions and
situations it is hard to see why codification would not be a bene-
fit.8 ' Mr. Elihu Root, one of the most eminent of American
jurists, remarks that "there is but one way in which the weak-
ness of international law can be cured and that is by the process
of codification, a process which must extend through long
periods, and which has already been going on very gradually for
many years. The development of international relations in all
their variety, in the multitude of questions that arise, goes on
more rapidly than the development of international law; and if
you wait for customs without any effort to translate the custom
into definite statements from year to year, you will never get
any law settled except by bitter controversy. We cannot expect
custom to lag behind the action to which the law should be
applied.1'32
Another distinguished American jurist remarks that "the
most generally accepted conclusion appears to be that codifica-
tion is desirable if the purpose be merely to obtain clearness and
brevity and harmony for existing law; something more than the
'Garner, op. cit. 765.
"Garner, op. cit. 766.
12 Root, ADDRESSES ON INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS (1916) 406. See also
his address before the American Society of International Law, 1910, 5 Ai.
3. INT. LAW, 577 ft.
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aggregations of a digest, but not enough to retard wholesome de-
velopment." And he adds, "it would seem, therefore, that when-
ever the civilized nations by common understanding or by
special agreement have decided that certain conduct is improper
and will not be tolerated, the rules governing such a situation
should be finally, clearly, and definitely expressed in writing."' 33
It would seem, then, according to the preponderance of juris-
tic opinion, that the question is largely one of scope and method
rather than of desirability. Regarding the scope, some jurists
maintain that the task of codification should be restricted to
the mere formulation and statement of the existing rules of law,
that is those rules which have already received the assent and
sanction of the nations. This is, strictly speaking, all that the
word "codification" really implies, and restricted to these limits
the task would be relatively simple. It would not, of course,
constitute very great progress if restricted in this fashion.
Most jurists, however, when they advocate "codification" of
international law, mean more than this. Mr. Root, for example,
remarks that "the substantial work of international codification
is not merely to state rules, but to secure agreement as to what
the rules are, by the nations whose usage must confirm them."
And he adds: "Except as a means to this end, any codification
of international law can be of little value except as a topical in-
dex and guide to the student. ' 34 To codify international law is
then primarily to set in motion and promote the law-making
process itself in the community of nations. In other words,
codification, in this sense, involves legislation as well as arrange-
ment and coordination of rules.
In regarding the scope of the task of codification, almost all
jurists are agreed that it is not practicable to attempt at one
time to embody within the limits of a code the entire body of
international law. All concur in the belief that the process must
take the form of partial codification, that, following the methods
already adopted by the Hague Conferences, the law relating to
" Address of Hon. Charles Nagel before American Society of Internation-
al Law. Proceedings, 28-29.
"E. Root: Codification of International Law (1910) 5 AI. J. INT. LAW,
579. See also Reinsch in Proceedings of the American Society of Inter-
national Law (1910) 37. Oppenheim, op. cit. 46. Compare also Nagel;
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1910) 29.
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particular subjects must from time to time be agreed upon and
formulated in definite rules and that this process should be car-
ried on until eventually the codification of the whole body of law
may be accomplished. The final question and one which in the
past has greatly troubled all jurists, that is, by whom and ac-
cording to what procedure the drafts should be prepared, seems
to be answered by the recent action of the League of Nations.
On September 22, 1924, .upon the proposal of the Swedish delega-
tion, the fifth Assembly of the League adopted a unanimous
resolution, requesting the Council to convene a committee of ex-
perts, representative of the main forms of civilization and the
principal legal systems of the world. This committee was to be
charged with the duty, among others,
To prepare a provisional list of the subjects of inter-
national law, the regulation of which by international agree-
ment would seem to be most desirable and realisable at the
present moment; and
To report to the Council on the questions which are suffi-
ciently ripe and on the procedure which might be followed
with a view to preparing eventually for conferences for
their solution.
Such a committee of experts was, accordingly, appointed by
the Council of the League of Nations at its 32nd session in Rome
in December, 1924. Following a second meeting at Geneva,
January 12-29, 1926, the Committee, through the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the League, addressed to the Governments of the coun-
tries, whether members of the League or not, communications
embodying a provisional list of the subjects of international law
the regulation of which by international agreement seemed to the
committee to be most desirable and realisable at the present
moment. These subjects relate to: (1) nationality, (2) terri-
torial waters, (3) diplomatic privileges and immunities, (4) re-
sponsibility of states in respect of injuries caused in their terri-
tory to the person or property of foreigners, (5) procedure of
international conferences and procedure for the conclusion and
drafting of treaties, (6) piracy, and (7) exploitation of the
products of the sea.
The majority of the replies from some thirty governments, in-
cluding the United States, laid before the Committee of Experts
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss2/3
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at its third annual session, held at Geneva, March 22-April 2,
1927, were encouraging to the committee's view of the desira-
bility and feasibility of agreement upon the subjects listed pro-
visionally. At the same session, the committee determined on
the recommendation to the governments of the following addi-
tional subjects as ripe for international agreement, viz.: (1)
communication of judicial and extrajudicial acts and letters
rogatory in penal matters; (2) legal position and functions of
consuls; (3) revision of the classification of diplomatic agents,
and (4) jurisdiction of courts over foreign states.
At the eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of the League
of Nations, September, 1927, to which the subject had been re-
ferred by the 45th session of the Council in the preceding June,
the work of the committee of experts of the League was ex-
amined, and the Assembly decided, among other things, (1) to
summon the first Codification Conference, and to arrange for
its preparation and convocation, it being considered that such a
conference might be held in 1929 at The Hague; (2) to invite
the committee of experts to complete its work, and (3) to sub-
mit to such first conference, for examination, the questions of
(a) nationality, (b) territorial waters, and (c) responsibility of
States for damages done in their territory to the persons or
property of foreigners. It should be mentioned here that the
official initiative for the comprehensive codification of interna-
tional law was furnished by the Americas. It is impossible for
lack of space to enumerate here the actual attempts at and steps
toward codification taken by the Pan-American republics but
mere mention can be made that at a meeting of an International
Commission of American Jurists for the Codification of Inter-
national Law, Public and Private, which was held in Rio de
Janeiro, April 18-May 20, 1927, the conference adopted twelve
projects of public international law,3r and a code of private in-
" See Jacob H. Goetz, Newer Developments and Tendencies in Interna-
tiotal Law, 136, ANNALS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCI-
ENCE (1928) 22-46. The projects of conventions thus adopted relate to:
(1) The bases of international law; (2) states-their existence, equality,
recognition; (3) aliens; (4) treaties; (5) official publications; (6) inter-
change of professors and students; (7) diplomatic agents; (8) consuls;
(9) maritime neutrality; (10) asylum; (11) duties of states in case of
civil war, and (12) pacific settlement. It is questionable whether it is now
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ternational law, drafted by Antonio S. Bustamente, of Cuba,
embracing 439 articles, which were recommended for the con-
sideration of the Sixth Pan-American Conference to be held in
Havana, January, 1928.
The codification of international law, it would appear, has
passed beyond the theoretical stages of bickering and hairsplit-
ting argument as to its desirability or practicability, and seems
at this time to be in the actual course of progressive construction.
The work of the League committee and the Pan-American com-
mittee for codification bid fair to make this much thought-of
and oft-debated subject a reality. The leading jurists of the
world have recognized the special importance of codification of
international law because it is necessary at this time in order
to enlarge the service rendered by the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice, and have recommended and taken definite steps
to see that it is realized. They are in agreement that the great
task in the development of the World Court of Justice is not so
much the "mechanical organization of a body of men to judge and
decide questions of disagreement, as previous general agreement
on the part of the nations of the world as to what the matured
opinion of mankind considers just in the intercourse of nations."
This, as the Commission of Jurists saw it, is the great problem
to be solved, and they are now systematically proceeding to
solve it. Mr. Elihu Root believes that the civilized world is
turning its hopes for the future toward the development of three
institutions, which taken together promise to facilitate the
preservation of peace to a degree never before obtained. These
are as follows:
(1) An automatic system providing for immediate general
conference whenever serious irritation arises between
nations, whether it be upon conflicts of policy or misunder-
standing or resentment.
(2) An established system for the determination by a
permanent and competent court of the questions of legal
right arising between nations.
necessary or advisable for the Pan-American states to overlap the labors
of the committee of experts and the League of Nations in which most of the
governments, including the United States, have been cooperating. Un-
doubtedly they could make constructive contributions, supplementing the
more general undertaking of the League of Nations.
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(3) An established system to facilitate and regulate arbi-
tration, which will bring the opinion of impartial arbi-
trators, selected by the parties, to bear upon controverted
questions not strictly or wholly justiciable in their nature36
The first of these institutions is supplied within the limits of its
membership by the League of Nations. The second is supplied
for the benefit of the whole world by the Permanent Court of
International Justice. The third is supplied for the whole world
by the continuing organization of the original Hague Court of
Arbitration established by the first Hague Conference in 1899.
It will be observed that the first of these institutions "affords
opportunity for conciliation, for the friendly expression of out-
side opinion, for the cooling effects of deliberation, for a reali-
zation of other points of view, and for reflection upon the re-
sults of braving the public opinion of the world. All three of
these institutions afford opportunity for dispelling misunder-
standing and suspicion by the ascertainment and determination
of facts through such commissions or investigations as may be
adapted to the particular requirements of the several institu-
tions. It may also be observed that the existence of the League
of Nations, with its essential feature of ever-ready conference,
is a distinct advantage, not only to its members, but to nations
which are not members of the League. ' '1 7
There are some people of course who expect human institu-
tions to be born full-grown. They oppose and condemn the codi-
fication of international law because it could not be accomplished
over night. It is this class of irreconciliables who condemn and
denounce the Hague Court of Arbitration, the Permanent Court
of International Justice, the League of Nations, and all the in-
ternational conferences of the post-war period because they
have not already stopped all wars. These people would have
the clock begin by striking twelve. As Mr. Reed puts it, "Im-
mediately after planting an acorn they would dig it up and throw
it away because it is not already an oak." They fail to under-
stand that all international progress is the result, never of com-
pulsion but always of process, and that process has to go on in
the minds and feelings of many widely different nations, and
Root, Codification of International Law, 19 Am. J. INT. LAw, 675.
Root, op. cit. 677.
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therefore it must be slow. The progressive codification of in-
ternational law by slow and partial codification of those subjects
which are ripe for codification, and those remaining as they be-
come ripe for codification, will be one of the noteworthy achieve-
ments of the next century. More progress towards the abolition
and outlawry of the ancient institution of war and the substitu-
tion in its stead of a means for pacific settlement of disputes
through the application of law, has been made in the last thirty
years than in the whole period of history before the year 1900.
In conclusion let us, bear in mind that although human nature
cannot be changed, standards of conduct can be, but always
gradually, never violently. If the path of international progress
is clearly envisioned the first important question is not, what is
the complete and perfect system which should be obtained. The
first important question is, how many steps along that path can
all these nations, differing in interests and circumstances and
traditions, and modes of thought and feeling, be brought to agree
upon now. That is the first thing to ascertain, and when it is
ascertained, although it may be possible to get immediate agree-
ment upon only one step, the part of wisdom is to get that step
agreed upon and put into effect. Get your institution out of the
realm of theory into that of fact, and then, if you are right, your
fact will immediately begin to change the way in which men
think. The work of codification of international law and the
development and perfection of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice will go on hand in hand. One is the comple-
ment of the other. The steady progress of codification will help
the efficient functioning of the Court, and the decisions handed
down by the Court of International Justice, and the interpreta-
tion which it gives to those portions of law which are not yet
settled, will help the task of codification. It may, of course, re-
ceive its setbacks and delays but in time it will become an ac-
complished fact. One by one, as the different branches of inter-
national law become settled, they will be codified, and periodical-
ly as particular portions of the codified law fall behind the
progress of the world, they will be revised and modified to meet
changing conditions. In this way, by the gradual but steady
codification of parts of international law through the medium
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of periodical conferences of the nations, the task of codification
of international law will become no longer a subject for the
amusement of cynics and the dreams of idealists, but another
actual step towards the peaceful government of a world com-
munity founded upon a firm legal basis and governed and regu-
lated not by war but by law.
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